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Abstract—This paper presents BodyPIN, which is a continuous
user authentication system by contactless wireless sensing using
commodity Wi-Fi. BodyPIN can track the current user’s legal
identity throughout a computer system’s execution. In case the
authentication fails, the consequent accesses will be denied to
protect the system. The recent rich wireless-based user identifi-
cation designs cannot be applied to BodyPIN directly, because
they identify a user’s various activities, rather than the user
herself. The enforced to be performed activities can thus interrupt
the user’s operations on the system, highly inconvenient and not
user-friendly. In this paper, we leverage the bio-electromagneetics
domain human model for quantifying the impact of human body
on the bypassing Wi-Fi signals and deriving the component that
indicates a user’s identity. Then we extract suitable Wi-Fi signal
features to fully represent such an identity component, based
on which we fulfill the continuous user authentication design.
We implement a BodyPIN prototype by commodity Wi-Fi NICs
without any extra or dedicated wireless hardware. We show that
BodyPIN achieves promising authentication performances, which
is also lightweight and robust under various practical settings.
I. INTRODUCTION
Most computer systems require the user authentication only
at the login step. The systems then can be accessed once the
authentication is successful, even the user may temporarily
leave afterwards [1]. However, such an one-time authentication
scheme could expose systems to adversaries, especially during
the user’s absent period, and cause severe security issues, such
as the illegal copy of private documents, the peep of sensitive
information, malicious modifications of system configurations,
etc. The victim systems can be common computers, as shown
in Fig. 1, and could also be the emerging mobile devices [2],
e.g., smart phones or wearables, as well as various Internet of
Things (IoTs) devices in a smart cyber-space.
To defend this crucial security issue, the concept of contin-
uous authentication was proposed [3], aiming to keep track
of the current user’s legal identity throughout the system’s
operation. In case the authentication interrupts, e.g., the legal
user leaves and/or the adversary appears, the system is locked
automatically. One naive way for achieving this is to ask the
user to frequently authenticate herself, e.g., by her password or
fingerprint, but this will interrupt the user’s normal operations
on the system, i.e., highly inconvenient and not user-friendly.
To overcome this limitation, the contactless sensing based
designs are widely proposed. Specifically, various sensors can
be adopted to sense the user’s certain biometric features [4].
Then we can match them with the pre-recorded feature profiles

Fig. 1: System illustration. (left): Wi-Fi related biometrics
are registered by BodyPIN after a legal user logs in, and the
computer can be continuously accessed; (middle): if the user
leaves, the system is unaccessible; (right): once an adversary
appears, biometrics mismatch and adversary’s access is denied.
for the authentication. As the entire process is fully passive to
the user and does not require any user’s touch on the device,
e.g., no password input, the authentication thus can continuous,
without interrupting the user’s operations on the system.
Following this principle, there are two main types of designs
proposed in the literature, the camera-based and wireless-based
solutions. For the former category, the features, like the colors
of the user’s cloth and skin [4] and the gaze moving pattern
[5], can be utilized. However, the camera-based designs suffer
two obvious issues. First, due to the limited camera view
angle, the user should be directly captured by the camera
(without blocking) in good lighting conditions, which may
limit the usable scenarios [1]. Second, cameras can also cause
the privacy leakage issue [6], [7] if the recorded video is not
properly protected or gets hacked by the adversaries. Due to
these concerns, the wireless sensing based designs promising
appear recently [1], [8]–[11], which can effectively bypass
these two issues. However, the existing designs either require
the user to perform certain activities [9]–[11], e.g., walking,
or a dedicated hardware design [1], which could inevitably
interrupt the user’s operations as well, or increase the system
deploying and maintaining costs, e.g., not pervasive enough.
Motivated by these existing works, in this paper, we explore
the opportunity to achieve the continuous user authentication
using commodity wireless techniques, like Wi-Fi [12], without
imposing any activities performed by the user. If this is viable,
the solution should be able to preserve the merits from prior
wireless-based designs, and meanwhile also largely reduces
the system cost. However, the key questions is without the
dedicated wireless design, whether suitable features from Wi-
Fi signals exist to strongly identify a user’s identity along for
the continuous authentication design. Such an identification
implies that the explored features should be related to the
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user’s biometric features directly, rather than the performed
activities as previously studied [9]–[11], which, to our best
knowledge, has not been explored yet.
Our investigation in this paper is inspired by the exist-
ing studies from the bio-electromagnetics domain [13]–[16],
which have the proper model to abstract the human body
for understanding the interactions between the electromagnetic
waves and human body. Based on such a design preliminary,
we quantify the impact of our body on bypassing Wi-Fi signals
and derive the component that indicates a user’s identity, which
is jointly determined by the user body’s appearance, e.g., the
radius of our body’s intersecting surface, and also our body’s
internal factors, e.g., permittivity, permeability, body-fat ratio,
etc. The component is hence highly user-dependent, which
is qualified for the user authentication. Then, our next effort
is to extract suitable Wi-Fi signal features to fully represent
the user’s identity component. To this end, we conduct an in-
depth analysis and figure out a set of Wi-Fi biometrics traits or
features from the channel state information (CSI) [17]. Based
on this, we finally design a continuous authentication system,
BodyPIN, which can achieve both a high true-positive (TP)
rate, for the least interruption to the legal users, and a low
false-positive (FP) rate, for the least misses of the adversaries.
Fig. 1 depicts how BodyPIN works. In Fig. 1 (left),
when a legal user logs in a computer system, her Wi-Fi
related biometrics features are registered for the continuous
authentication. Later, when the user leaves, the Wi-Fi feature
matching becomes unsuccessful and the system turn to be
unaccessible, as in Fig. 1(middle). In such a case, the system
can deny the access from those who have the mismatched Wi-
Fi biometrics features, as illustrated in Fig. 1 (right). Following
this working flow, we implement a BodyPIN prototype using
Intel 5300 wireless NICs. Extensive evaluations show that it
can achieve very good authentication performance, nearly 90%
authenticating accuracy and defending precision with a group
of 30 subjects. The computation is light-weighted, around
300ms, which is sufficient for the real-time authentication.
In summary, the contributions of this paper are as follows:
• We propose a continuous user authentication system,
BodyPIN, using the commodity Wi-Fi signals through a
contactless wireless sensing design.
• We identify the signal component that are directly related
to each individual user and extract a set of suitable Wi-Fi
signal features to represent it for the authentication.
• We implement a BodyPIN prototype and conduct exten-
sive experiments for the evaluation, which demonstrates
promising and robust performance.
II. IMPACT OF HUMAN BODY ON WI-FI SIGNALS
Existing studies have empirically demonstrate that our hu-
man body could have impacts on the electromagnetic waves,
like absorption, within a certain frequency band, which covers
Wi-Fi’s frequencies [13]–[16]. In this section, we strive to
further quantify the impact and setup the relation between the
Wi-Fi signal features and each individual user’s characteristics,
based on which we can achieve the BodyPIN design.
transmitter receiver
human body
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Fig. 2: The human body is modeled as a series of circles that
represent different tissue layers and each layer could cause
different attenuations for the bypassing Wi-Fi signals.
To this end, we first borrow the classic human model from
the bio-electromagnetics domain, as in Fig. 2, which abstracts
the human body as a series of circles to represent different
tissues [16], such as the skin, fat under the skin, muscle, fat
on the viscera, viscera, bone, etc., and the radius of layer i
is ri, where i ∈ [1, n] and n is the total number of layers.
Although this model is simple, similar as prior studies [14],
we find that it is effective enough for our analysis (§IV).
As shown in Fig. 2, we denote the distances from the user
to the transmitter and receiver as l1 and l2, respectively. Other
useful notations are tabulated in Table I. According to the
table, the initial Wi-Fi signals generated at the transmitter side,
i.e., X , can be mathematically written as:
X = A · e−j·2pi·f ·t+φ0 , (1)
where φ0 is the initial phase, and A and f are the amplitude
and frequency, respectively. After the signal X’s transmission
from the transmitter to the receiver, its amplitude and phase
both will change, and the receiver can receive multiple copies
of this signal due to the multipath. For the cope that bypasses
the user’s body (stated below), we find that its signal changes
convey the user’s biometric features.
Amplitude. During signal X’s transmission, its amplitude
A decays, in terms of the signal power, along the time.
Such a decay effect occurs for every propagation medium. In
particular for the power decay of wireless signals, the decayed
power amount can be computed through the Friis transmission
equation [18]. To facilitate the understanding, we omit the
sophisticated intermediate steps and provide the expression of
received signal amplitude A′ reflected by the user as follows:
A′ = A · c01 · c02 ·
∏n
i=1
ci, (2)
where ci is the power decay due to the layer i of the user’s
body (Fig. 2), n is the total number of layers that reflect the
signals, c01 and c
0
2 represent power decays from the transmitter
to the user and from the user to the receiver, respectively.
Phase. Next, we compute the phase changes, which are
caused by the time (propagation) delay, t. In particular, we
consider t as a sum of every time delay taking place at
every propagation medium, e.g., in the air or various body
layers, as t =
∑m
i=1 ti, where m is the total amount of
Symbols Meaning
f Frequency of the Wi-Fi signal
A Initial amplitude of the Wi-Fi signal
φ0 Initial phase of the Wi-Fi signal
m Total amount of propagation mediums
l1 Distance from the transmitter to the user
l2 Distance from the user to the receiver
di1 In-body length of Wi-Fi in the the ith. layer of human body
di2 Out-body length of Wi-Fi in the the ith. layer of human body
µi Permeability of the ith. layer of human body
εi Permittivity of the ith. layer of human body
µ0 Permeability of the air
ε0 Permittivity of the air
c01 Power decay from the transmitter to the user
c02 Power decay from the user to the receiver
ci Power decay in the ith. layer of human body
TABLE I: List of the mathematical symbols.
propagation mediums and ti is the delayed time caused by
every medium. Each ti can be calculated by ti = divi , where
di is the length of the ith medium and vi is the speed of Wi-Fi
signals in this medium. The vi can be further computed via
vi =
1√
µiεi
, where µi and εi represent the permeability and
permittivity of the transmission medium i. By combining the
three equations above, we can derive the time delay from each
Wi-Fi propagation medium by the summarization as follows.
t =
∑m
i=1
di · √µiεi.
According to Fig. 2, the time delay t can be rephrased as:
t =
n∑
i=1
(di1 + di2) · √µiεi + (l1 + l2) · √µ0ε0 (3)
where the former part is caused by our human body and the
later part is caused by propagation over the air. Then according
to the Eq. 1, Eq. 2 and Eq. 3, the reflected Wi-Fi signal copy
Y received by the receiver can be represented by:
Y =
n∏
i=1
cie
−j2pif
n∑
i=1
(di1+di2)
√
µiεi
::::::::::::::::::::::::
c01c
0
2e
−j2pif((l1+l2)√µ0ε0)X,
where the component marked with the wave line is uniquely
determined by each individual user.
Summary. Based on the mathematical expressions of this
component, we conclude that the properties of human body,
such as the absorption ability, permittivity, permeability and
the length of each tissue layer, could have joint impacts on the
Wi-Fi signals, which are user-dependent. In [16], permittivity
and permeability of the tissues, such as the muscle, kidney,
liver, etc., have been empiriclally measured. People indeed
find that different tissues could cause different influences on
the bypassing wireless signals. The intuition is clear — each
type of the tissues has unique compositions and could thus lead
to a unique influence on the Wi-Fi signals, which motivates
our continuous authentication design in the next section.
On the other hand, as the received Y is just one multipath
copy from all received signals by the receiver. It implies that
when the user is closer to the line of sight path from the sender
to the receiver, it is more likely that the user’s unique features
can be reliably detected. As unveiled in §IV, the authentication
is robust in multiple real-world scenarios, which is sufficient
for the practical usage.
III. SYSTEM DESIGN
In this section, we elaborate the BodyPIN design. We first
describe the system working flow (§III-A), followed by the
Wi-Fi based biometrics feature extraction (§III-B) and the
authentication design (§III-C).
A. System working flow
Fig. 3 shows the working flow of the BodyPIN system.
After a legal user logs into the computer system by any
conventional authentication (i.e., primary authentication), such
as passwords, fingerprints, face recognitions, etc., successfully,
BodyPIN starts to record the Wi-Fi time series. In particular,
BodyPIN processes the channel state information (CSI) from
the received Wi-Fi packets, by removing identified ampli-
tude and phase errors, to obtain desired biometric related
features. These features (after one- or two-minute recording)
are registered in the system and utilized to train a classifier
to recognize this legal user for the continuous authentication.
More precisely, the system periodically collects CSI samples
to generate new Wi-Fi based features about the current user,
and then matches them with the registered ones. If matched,
the current user is viewed to be legal and the classifier can
also be updated by the newly collected features; Otherwise,
BodyPIN locks the system until the primary authentication is
passed again.
Two points are worth noting: 1) BodyPIN is not positioned
to replace any primary authentication methods. Hence, the
user still needs to well protect their primary authentication
keys, like passwords and fingerprints, at the first place. 2) The
aim of the on-site feature extraction for training the classifier
is to improve the authentication robustness and minimize the
possibilities of the false alarm cases that could interrupt the
user’s normal operations.
B. Wi-Fi based biometric feature extraction
As suggested by the insights from the analysis in Section II,
we extract Wi-Fi based user’s biometric features in this sec-
tion. Prior to the design details, we briefly introduce the related
Wi-Fi information related to BodyPIN in the following.
Channel state information. In modern Wi-Fi protocols,
e.g., 802.11n/ac, the digit information delivered from the trans-
mitter to the receiver is carried by multiple electromagnetic
waves at different frequencies, where each specific-frequency
band is called subcarrier, so that the orthogonal frequency
division modulation (OFDM) [19] can be applied for the data
transmission. Supposing the transmitter transmits X and the
receiver receives it as Y after the propagation through the
wireless channel H . We thus have:
Y = H ·X + n, (4)
where n is for channel noise. Recently, many advanced Wi-Fi
NICs can report the detailed channel state information (CSI)
Matching
engine
User logging in
Extract featuresRecord WiFi
Register biometrics Extract featuresRecord WiFi
Biometrics matching
a certain period
Fig. 3: System working flow. Once a legal user logs in, the Wi-Fi signals are recorded for the biometric feature extraction. The
extracted features are registered for the continuous authentication. To this end, new samples of the Wi-Fi based features are
collected and further matched with the registered ones. If matched, the current user is viewed to be legal; Otherwise, BodyPIN
locks the system until the primary authentication is passed again.
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Fig. 4: Processing CSI amplitudes and angles. (a), (b): We use low-pass Butterworth filter to suppress the jitters in the CSI
amplitude series. (c), (d): We compute and further filter the differences of every two continuous phases. The results are shown
in (d), which are for a further feature extraction (series of the 1st, 15th and 30th subcarrier are depicted).
to describe channel H in each subcarrier level, which can be
obtained through many existing CSI extraction tools [12], [20].
Wi-Fi based features. The CSI information essentially
describes the relation of Y/X . Further recalling the component
marked with the wave line in the derived Y in Section II,
we can observe that such a component (related to a series of
properties of the user) is also included in the obtained the CSI
information, which can be reflected from both the amplitude
and phase two aspects of the CSI.
With many prior investigations [21], [22] to extract various
types of features from CSI time series, in BodyPIN, we
select a preliminary set of features from the CSI amplitude
and phase, including 1) mean, 2) maximum, 3) minimum, 4)
mean absolute deviation, (5) interquartile range, (6) root mean
square, (7) skewness and (8) kurtosis. Both amplitudes and
phases of all subcarriers, e.g., 30 subcarriers from Intel 5300
NICs, can be applied to these features, which lead to the
feature dimensions being 8× 30× 2 = 480.
Although rich features could be identified, we find that they
cannot be directly adopted, due to the surrounding noises and
imperfection of WiFi adapter. As a result, the raw CSI, both
amplitude and phase, collected by the CSI tool [12], will suffer
non-negligible fluctuation as illustrated in Fig. 4 (a, c). Inspired
by the related works [21], [23], we need to carefully process
the collected CSIs (for removing such noises) before designing
the classifier for the continuous authentication.
1) Processing CSI amplitudes. Generally, when a user sitting
before the monitor, her body movement is usually in low
frequency. Owing to this, we consider the high-frequency
jitters shown in Fig. 4 (a) are noises, thus, we apply a low-pass
Butterworth filter (5th order, 1Hz of the cut-off frequency)
to filter these noises and smooth the time series of CSI
amplitude [21], [23]. The filtering results are shown in the
Fig. 4 (b), where the 1st and the 2nd subfigures are the
raw amplitudes and the filtered amplitudes, respectively. We
find that the filter can dramatically reduce jitters in the raw
amplitude series.
2) Processing CSI phases. The noises in the time series of
the CSI phases is much different compared with amplitudes, as
shown in in Fig. 4 (c), it has a decreasing slope in the sampling
duration. Prior work have studied this phenomena [20], [22],
[24], [25] and conclude that it is introduced by joint impacts
from a series of offsets shown as follows:
φ = φT + φs + φb + φm + 2pif∆t, (5)
where φ and φT stand for the measured phase and true phase,
respectively. The φs, φb and φm are sampling frequency offset,
packet boundary detection uncertainty and measurement error,
respectively, which are considered uncontrollable but follow
certain probability distributions, e.g., the Gaussian. The last
component, i.e., 2pif∆t, is a constant, where f is the carrier
frequency offset of the receiver.
To eliminate the carrier frequency offset in a lightweight
manner, we find that the phase errors can be largely removed
by the difference of two continuous phases as follows:
φ′t = φt+1 − φt, (6)
where φ′t is the phase difference at the sampling time of t.
We import such differentiated phases, instead of raw phases,
to the Butterwork filter for the feature extraction.
3) Putting them all together. In summary, after BodyPIN
collects the CSI samples, it first processes their amplitudes
time1 time4
time2 time3
time1 time4
time2 time3
Fig. 5: Matching and authentication in a 2D view. left: User’s
biometrics are extracted at 4 continuous periods and stored. A
user whose biometrics features match with one of the stored
biometrics is viewed to be legal. right: If we do not use
multiple clustering strategy, the authentic range needs to be
much larger, which would lead to higher false positive rates.
and phases, and then extracts the selected features, based on
which a classifier can be trained. To avoid the curse of di-
mensionality, we apply unsupervised dimensionality reduction
on these features by principal component analysis (PCA) [26].
Empirically, we reserve 90% of information (variance) in the
feature dataset. Prior to train the classifier, we normalize the
feature values in the dataset within [-1, +1].
C. Continuous authentication via biometrics matching
So far, we have introduced the CSI based biometrics feature
extraction. In this subsection, we elaborate the matching and
authentication designs in BodyPIN.
Matching strategy. According to the system working flow
in Fig. 3, BodyPIN records the CSI series for registering a le-
gal user’s biometrics features when she logs into the computer
system for the first time, by the primary authentication. In
constructing the classifier to recognize legal users, we consider
a practical setting — as the user may not always stay still, the
reflected Wi-Fi signals from the user may vary at the receiver
side. As a consequence, the constituents of the user-dependent
factors extracted from various signals can be slightly different,
e.g., the impacts of some factors may vary, even though they
belong to the same user.
To tackle this issue, we set BodyPIN to continuously record
CSI for several periods, e.g., each period last for 30 seconds.
For example, as shown in the Fig. 5 (left), BodyPIN records
CSI and extracts biometrics features for 4 periods. In each
period, biometrics samples are collected to form a clustering
range, and these ranges together can be further converted to
an aggregated Bayes probability range, for deciding whether
a newly coming feature sample corresponds the legal user.
Technically, taking the time1 shown in Fig. 5 for example,
in this period, we collect n biometrcis samples, e.g., one-
second CSI series contributing one sample, for the legal user,
represented by s1 to sn. Supposing the dimension of these
samples is m, and the value of the jth dimension of the
ith sample is represented by sji . With these samples, we first
compute the mean , and variance of each dimension, which
are represented by µj and σ2
j
. Afterwards, for any sample s,
we have its authentic probability equation as follows by the
Bayes inference:
p(1|s) = p(1) ∗ p(s|1)
p(s)
, (7)
where in recording biometrics, p(1) = 1, and p(s) is unreach-
able and neglected in our application. Supposing the values
in different dimensions are independently with each other, we
have a further equation based on Eq. 7:
p(1|s) ∝
m∏
j=1
p(sj |1) (8)
Supposing p(sj |1) follows a Gaussian distribution. Combin-
ing the computed mean, µj , and variance, σ2
j
, we have:
p(1|s) ∝
m∏
j=1
1√
2piσ2j
e
− (sj−µj)2
2σ2
j . (9)
After the value is computed, we normalize it by an operator
of m
√·, and take the result as p(1|s). Finally, we can obtain
the probabilities of the n samples, from p(1|s1) to p(1|sn).
Authentication. For the authentication, we sort these n
probabilities in a descending order and set a probability
threshold, p′, at the 90%. When facing a new sample, if
the probability, p(1|snew), is greater than p′, BodyPIN will
consider it is from the legal user. The final decision is jointly
made by the probability thresholds at all recording periods:
p(1|snew) ≥ p′1 ‖ p(1|snew) ≥ p′2 ‖ · · · ‖ p(1|snew) ≥ p′t,
where ‖ is the operator of the logical OR, and t is the number
of continuous CSI based biometrics sampling periods. For the
example Fig. 5, the t equals to 4.
Eq. 10 indicates that if the authentic probability is greater
than any one of the probability thresholds, BodyPIN considers
the user to be legal. As shown in Fig. 5, if the new biometrics
sample is within any one of these 4 shadow ranges, it passes
the authentication. One significant advantage of this strategy is
clear, that is, it makes BodyPIN resilient to user state change.
In addition, dividing recorded CSI series with multiple smaller
periods, comparing with the whole series, can largely decrease
the false positive (FP) rate, i.e., recognizing an illegal user as
the legal one. We still use Fig. 5 (left) to explain this issue.
With our strategy, the authentic ranges are 4 small shadow
circles. However, if we adopt a long recording time, in order
to cover these samples shown in the figure, we need one much
larger circle, shown in Fig. 5 (right), which would cover much
bigger range and causes higher FP rates.
Updating classifier. Considering the common variation of
user’s pose and position, which may lead to new user bio-
metrics features and cause false negative (FN), we update the
classifier with the latest recorded biometrics features during
the continuous authentication.
IV. EVALUATION
A. Experimental setup
In our experiments, we utilize Intel 5300 wireless NICs to
record CSI. Specifically, the frequency is 5 GHz and the packet
Fig. 6: System deployment. We refit a mini-pc with Intel 5300
NIC and take it as the transmitter. A desktop attached with
Intel 5300 NIC works as a computer system embedded with
BodyPIN. Subjects are asked to sit before the monitor and to
act as their usual behaviors.
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Fig. 7: Subjects’ detailed information. (left): Their weights
and heights; (right): Subjects’ apparels.
transmission rate is 50 Hz. As shown in Fig. 6, the transmitter
is a mini-pc and the receiver is a desktop, which runs Ubuntu
14.04 OS. We use a PCIe-X1 to mini-PCIe adapter to make the
card attached on the motherboard of desktop. 30 subjects are
recruited in the experiment. Some of them play as the common
user and operate on the computer. Other subjects act as the
surrounding people to mainly investigate the robustness of our
system against such an influence. The detailed information of
these 30 subjects, i.e., their weights, heights and apparels, is
recorded in Fig. 7.
B. Overall performance
We show overall performances, including mean interrup-
tion interval, mean authentication accuracy, mean defending
precision and authentication time delay in this subsection.
Mean interruption interval. We first consider the case that
BodyPIN authorizes legal users wrongly as adversaries (true
negative), which interrupts the user’s operation due to the re-
logging in. We ask 30 subjects to sit as in Fig. 6 for 60
minutes and record corresponding CSI based biometrics. We
do continuous authentication every 5 minutes and record the
time and frequency of the first interruption in Fig. 8 (left).
For instance, BodyPIN first interrupts 5 subjects at time of
the 40 minutes. Meanwhile, if BodyPIN does not interrupts in
these 60 minutes, we record the first interruption time as the
60 minutes, that is, BodyPIN does not interrupts 8 subjects
in these 60 minutes. We compute the mean interruption
interval (mI2) by using following equation.
mI2 =
∑
t∈{5,10,...,60}
nt × t/N, (10)
where nt is the amount of the first interruption taking place
at time t, and N stands for the amount of subjects 30. Then,
we have the average interruption interval of BodyPIN in the
evaluation dataset is 43.5 minutes. We made a questionnaire
about the acceptable interruption interval among these sub-
jects, 27 out of 30 think this interruption interval is acceptable
considering of the security issue.
Mean authentication accuracy. We examine the next met-
ric, named mean authentication accuracy (mA2), to evaluate
BodyPIN performance on true positive (TP ) authentication.
As shown in Fig. 8 (left), one subject is interrupted by
BodyPIN at the 10 minutes, which means BodyPIN works
incorrectly at the second time on this subject (first time
is at 5 minutes). Thus, we compute the accuracy of this
situation as (10 − 5)/10 = 50%. For example, if the first
interruption happens at time 55, the corresponding accuracy
is (55 − 5)/55 = 90.91%. Note that, if BodyPIN does not
interrupts a subject, the accuracy on this subject is 100%. By
this definition, we have the mean authentication accuracy as:
mA2 =
∑
t∈{5,10,...,55} nt
t−5
t + n60 × 100%
N
, (11)
where the n60 is the frequency of first interruption happening
at the 60 minutes. Inputting the value shown in Fig. 8 (left),
we have mean authentication accuracy as 88.16%.
Mean defending precision. We then evaluate the third
metric, mean defending precision (mDP ) of BodyPIN, which
is a metric for defending adversaries correctly.
In particular, for one subject, we treat him/her as the
authorized user, and consider the remaining 29 subjects as
adversaries. We set BodyPIN does continuous authentication
every 5 minutes, thus, every adversary is tested by 60/5 = 12
times. We repeat similar testings for the other 29 subjects.
As shown in Fig. 8 (middle), the value of the element in
the (i, j) block represents the frequency in our dataset that
BodyPIN wrongly considers the jth adversary as authorized
user when we doing above processing at the ith subject. Then
we can compute mean defending precision with Eq. 12.
mDP = 1−
∑
i 6=j, i,j∈[1,N ] p(i, j)
(N − 1)×N (12)
where N is 30, p(i, j) is the element value at the block of
(i, j). Finally, the mean defending precision of BodyPIN is
90.18% based on Fig. 8 (middle).
Authentication time delay. The main authentication time
delay consists of applying filters, computing CSI based bio-
metrics and bimectrics matching. We use a desktop with
Intel i5-3470S CPU and 32GB RAM to evaluate the au-
thentication delay. We repeatedly do these computation and
record the cost of time for 1K times, which results in a
boxplot shown in Fig. 8 (right). From the figure, we know
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Fig. 8: Overall evaluation results of BodyPIN. (left): Time and frequency of first interruption happening; (middle): Confusion
matrix on defending precision. (right): Time cost at 3 main processing stages, applying filters, extracting features and matching.
medians of time cost on these three processing stages are
70ms, 115ms and 105ms, respectively. This light-weighted
computation requirement enables BodyPIN run continuous
authentication in real-time system. We notice the maximal
delay is 1300ms (200+400+700), which is acceptable for the
common usage.
C. Micro-benchmark experiments
There exist some empirical selections in designing BodyPIN
algorithms. To make a better understanding on the relation
between these selections and performance, we conduct micro-
benchmark experiments in this subsection.
Information reserving rate in dimensionality reduction.
In the CSI based biometrics features processing, we apply
PCA to reduce data dimensionality. In the overall evaluation,
we selectively reserve 90% information (variance) of the data.
Here we adjust the information reserving rate to evaluate the
ability of dimensionality reduction.
Reserved information mI2 mA2 mDP
85% 44.83 89.43% 84.11%
90% 43.50 88.16% 90.18%
95% 41.50 84.49% 92.23%
100% 37.80 81.46% 83.50%
Recording duration Clustering group mI2 mA2 mDP
1 4 36.67 80.16% 92.34%
2 4 43.50 88.16% 90.18%
3 4 45.17 89.83% 90.46%
2 1 34.67 81.43% 85.35%
2 2 41.83 86.49% 86.74%
2 6 43.33 87.86% 93.54%
TABLE II: Ablation results on empirical selection of, up: re-
served information rate by PCA; bottom: CSI recording
duration and clustering group for registering features. The
result marked with bold font is the initial setting in §IV-B
As shown in Table II (up), we find (1) PCA is good for all
three metrics; (2) if PCA is applied, reserving less informa-
tion arises less interruption (more authentication accuracy);
however, (3) if PCA is applied, reserving less information
harms the precision of detecting adversaries. By analyzing
this phenomena, we infer that major features of subjects
are embedded in high variance dimensions, reserving these
features helps to identify legal users continuously (reason of
2). Besides, we think the reason behind phenomena (3) is a
L3L4
L1
L2
6m
5m
Location L1 L2 L3 L4
Tx-Rx distance 0.8m 2.8m 3.5m 5.5m
User position NLOS NLOS LOS LOS
mI2 43.50 40.67 41.33 39.17
mA2 88.16% 85.74% 86.85% 84.84%
mDP 90.18% 88.18% 89.27% 87.24%
Fig. 9: Settings on relative location among transmitter, receiver
and user. The setting marked with green shadow is the data
collecting scene shown in Fig. 6.
few subjects related features may exist in the small variance
dimensions, and if we ignore them, BodyPIN works worse in
identifying adversaries.
CSI recording duration and clustering groups for
preparing registering features. Having depicted in §III, after
authentic user logs in, BodyPIN records CSI series for a cer-
tain time to prepare registering CSI based biometrics features.
In the primary evaluation, we record 2 minutes and divide
them it 4 clustering groups, as illustrated in Fig. 5 (left). We
examine several other settings as shown in Table II (bottom).
From the first settings in Table II (bottom), we conclude
increasing CSI recording duration can make user’s features
stable and lead to less interruptions and better performance
on authorize legal users and defend illegal users. Meanwhile,
we ascribe the reason of the last three settings results to the
advantages of the multiple clustering strategy, depicted in §III
and illustrated in Fig. 5.
Relative location among transmitter, receiver and user.
We change router position at 4 typical places in a 5m × 6m
room to evaluate BodyPIN, which leads to users sitting in
line-of-sight (LOS) and non-line-of-sight (NLOS), shown in
Fig. 9 (left). The scene of the overall evaluation is marked
with green shadow. The involved subjects and process of data
collection keep the same with the overall evaluation.
The results shown in Fig. 9 (right) demonstrate BodyPIN
is robust to the change of relative location among transmitter,
receiver and user, which is practical for use. Specially, compar-
ing results of L1/L2, L3/L4, we notice BodyPIN works better
if transmitter and receiver put closer. Meanwhile, comparing
results of L2 and L3, which with similar distance, we conclude
that BodyPIN works better when users sitting in LOS.
Interference from other subjects. All above results are
derived from situation that only the user is in the room shown
in Fig. 9 (left), which arise our concerns on applying BodyPIN
in a more normal situation. Next, we evaluate the performance
of BodyPIN when facing the interference from other subjects
in surroundings. The data collection process and evaluation
metrics in this part are much different to those in the above,
thus, we explain them in details before going to results. Note
that, in this part, the relative location is the same as the L1
shown in Fig. 9 (left) if not mentioned.
1) Distance of one other subject. Illustrating in the first row
of Fig. 10, we first asked one user to sit before a monitor
and collected corresponding CSI series for 2 minutes, then we
asked one subject to stand behind the use with a distance about
0.6m and collected corresponding CSI series for 2 minutes.
During CSI collection, the user was asked to do the least
motions. The former 2-minute series are to train classifier,
and the later 2-minute series are for testing BodyPIN when
facing other subject. We tested distances around 0.6m, 1.2m,
1.8m, 2.4m, 3.0m and 3.6m and did this on up to 10 users.
To make it clear, we divide the later 2-minute series into
10 testing samples, then we obtain 100 testing samples on
10 users for every distance. The authentication accuracy are
73%, 81%, 87%, 90%, 93%, 91%, respectively. This indicates
BodyPIN still works well when facing the interference from
a subject 1.8m away from this relative location.
2) Number of other subjects. As shown in the Fig. 10 (mid-
dle), we first asked user to sit before a monitor and collected
corresponding CSI series for 2 minutes, then, we asked 2 other
subjects to stand behind the user and collected CSI series
for 2 minutes. Subjects were asked to change their positions
randomly for 10 times, and number of tested subjects increase
from 2 to 5. Thus, we have 10 × 10 = 100 samples when
testing every specific number. The authentication results are
87%, 83%, 80%, and 75% for number of 2, 3, 4 and 5,
respectively. This indicates user may have to re-log in with
his/her keys such as password, fingerprint, face etc if many
subjects appear in surrounding suddenly.
3) Motions of other subjects. We first asked 5 subjects to
move casually in the room, then one user was asked to sit
before the monitor. Concurrently, we recorded CSI series for
30 minutes for training classifiers. The amount of involved
users is still 10. We use the first 2-minute CSI series to
train classifiers, meanwhile, BodyPIN is set to do continuous
authentication every 3 minutes. Similar to metrics in overall
evaluation, finally, we have mI2, mA2 and mDP of 17.70,
82.07% and 84.23%, which indicates BodyPIN can still work
properly in noisy environment.
4) Relative location of other subjects. Please look at the
Fig. 9 (left), in the above three experiments, we selected rela-
tive position setting of L1 and asked other subjects appearing
behind the user, which cause the interference of other subjects
is mainly from NLOS. To test the interference from LOS,
we applied setting of L4 and utilized metrics as the above
3rd experiment. Not surprisingly, the performance decreases
to mI2 of 12.60, mA2 of 67.07% and mDP 69.50%, respec-
tively. This problem matches the human body impacts on Wi-
Fi signals depicted in §II. We highly recommend to set relative
Fig. 10: Testing influence from nearby subjects. (top): various
distances to the user; (middle): increasing nearby subjects’
amount; (bottom): influence from subjects’ casual motions.
position of transmitter and receiver there where would cause
the least LOS interference from other subjects.
D. Comparison evaluation
We make an extended evaluation to test the possibility
of applying BodyPIN as an alternative log-in authentication
keys like fingerprint, face, etc. To do this, we use the dataset
collected at the §IV-B to train multi-class classifiers with
LibSVM [27] (radius basis function kernel, L1 regularization,
L1 loss and one-against-all strategy). For each subject, data
collected in the first 48 minutes is for training, the remaining
12-minute data is for testing.
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Fig. 11: BodyPIN is extended as multi-class classifiers on CSI
based biometrics of 30 subjects. (left): classification accuracy;
(right): comparison with existing works.
We evaluate the user capacity of BodyPIN from 2 to 30.
When evaluating the user capacity of i (i ∈ [2, 30]), we
randomly select training dataset of i subjects and test with
their testing sets. As shown in Fig. 11 (left), BodyPIN can
achieve good performance, e.g., nearly 100% accuracy with
few subjects and more than 92% accuracy with the user
capacity of 30. We compare the accuracy with FreeSense [9],
WiFiID [11] and WiWho [10], and find BodyPIN outperforms
them, shown in Fig. 11 (right).
The additional evaluation demonstrates a possibility that
applying BodyPIN as an alternative log-in authentication keys.
However, it is still an open problem to make CSI based
biometrics stable and accurate as high as fingerprint, face, etc.
V. RELATED WORK
Bio-eletromagnetics. The BodyPIN design relates to the
bio-eletromagnetics literatures [13]–[16]. Some human tissues,
such as body muscle, kidney and liver, with different dielectric
properties are measured by signals from 10Hz to 20GHz [16].
The body’s absorption is studied by [13] in range of 30MHz
to 6GHz, and [15] in range of 1GHz to 15GHz. In [14], an
in-body electromagnetic transmit model is proposed and tested
in 2.45GHz. These works validate our body could have unique
impacts on wireless signals. Based on this, we further use the
effective body model from this domain in the BodyPIN design.
Biometrics based continuous authentication. The camera
can achieve continuous authentication, e.g., sensing the user’s
cloth and skin [4] , and the gaze moving patterns [5]. As
stated in the introduction, it requires strict line of the sight
and lighting conditions. More importantly, it may have severe
privacy concerns about the recorded video. To overcome these
issues, there are recent designs using wireless to achieve the
continuous authentication, like [1], which however requires
a dedicated hardware design. Compared with these existing
works, BodyPIN is a wireless-based solution avoiding cam-
era’s drawbacks, while utilizes commercial Wi-Fi devices only.
Wi-Fi based human identification. There also exist many
Wi-Fi-based human identification systems, e.g., WiWho [10],
WiFi-ID [11], FreeSense [9] and Radio-Bio [28]. However,
they require the user to perform certain activities, e.g., walking,
as they essentially recognize the user’s activities, instead of
the users themselves. Therefore, these designs are not suitable
for the continuous authentication, since frequently performing
the required activities could easily interrupt the user’s normal
usage of the computer system and dramatically sacrifices the
user experience.
Wi-Fi time series matching. Techniques of Wi-Fi time
series matching are also related to this paper. Existing tech-
niques mainly fall into two categories. First, the dynamic time
wrapping [29] is widely used in Wi-Fi time series comparison
for action recognition [30], [31] Another category is to convert
the Wi-Fi time series to statistics features such as minimum,
maximum and mean in [9]–[11], [28]. Guided by the second
category, we also extract useful features in BodyPIN, while
our feature extraction is inspired by the bio-eletromagnetic
model derived, so that they can uniquely and reliably represent
different users for the continuous authentication.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we demonstrate a contactless continuous
authentication system, BodyPIN, by using the human body
biometrics features conveyed in Wi-Fi signals. BodyPIN re-
quires no extra or dedicated wireless hardware but achieves
promising authentication performances, i.e., acceptable inter-
ruption interval, high authenticating and defending accuracy,
lightweight computation, resilience on surrounding people, etc.
Due to these strengths, we believe BodyPIN could be a useful
and practical system.
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